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Design, Crime and the Built Environment 
Professor Rachel Armitage  
Abstract 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a method of reducing 
crime through the design and manipulation of the built environment. Based upon the 
Opportunity Theories of crime, CPTED focuses upon blocking opportunities for 
criminal behaviour through subtle techniques to maximise informal surveillance, 
guardianship and maintenance, to minimise through movement and to set standards of 
physical security that are proportionate to crime risk. This chapter will discuss the 
principles of CPTED and the theories from which it evolved. It will explore the 
effectiveness of these principles, both individually and combined, in reducing crime, 
before exploring how CPTED is applied in practice.  
Introduction  
Crime takes many forms and occurs in many places, and whilst theories of crime 
causation are often generalised across different crime types, there is little empirical 
evidence to suggest that the prevention of child sexual exploitation, homicide or 
human trafficking (to give extreme examples) could be prevented using the measures 
outlined within this chapter. The focus here is largely upon the prevention or 
reduction of acquisitive crimes such is burglary in a dwelling, theft of and from 
vehicles and associated offences. By the nature of the targets of these offences, the 
focus is on residential housing and the areas surrounding those properties – the wider 
housing estate.   
 
The risk of becoming a victim of crime varies dramatically, based on a person’s age, 
gender, socio-economic and marital status to name just a few. Whilst the average risk 
of becoming a victim of crime in England and Wales in 2014-2015 was 15.9% (ONS, 
2015) for all adults, this increased to 22.1% for those aged 16-24, to 27.9% for 
mixed/multiple race adults, to 20% for single adults, to 22.7% for the unemployed 
and to 20.1% for private renters. Alternatively, those aged 75 and over have a risk of 
just 5.9%, white adults 15.7%, employed 18%, and for those who own their own 
home the risk is 14.1%. Whilst awareness of these enhanced risks can help to tailor 
interventions, to alert individuals and even to allocate crime reduction resources, to 
state the obvious, it is beyond the control of any agency tasked with the reduction of 
crime, to alter an individual’s age, race, gender or marital status.  
 
Yet whilst we can do little to alter risk associated with personal characteristics of 
victims, there is a vast amount that agencies can do to alter risk associated with the 
location in which a crime takes place, be that a house, a car park or open space. For 
example, the average risk of household crime in England and Wales in 2014-2015 
was 12.1%. For a detached house this decreased to 9.1%, for a terraced property this 
increased to 15%. We also know that risk of crime varies according to a property’s 
position on a development – corner plots experiencing more crime (Groff and La 
Vigne, 2001; Armitage et al, 2010) and being perceived by burglars as more attractive 
as a target for burglary (Taylor and Nee, 1988; Cromwell and Olson, 1991; Armitage 
and Joyce, in press). Properties visible from footpaths experience higher levels of 
crime (Armitage, 2006a; Armitage et al, 2010) and properties designed to be 
overlooked by others experience less crime (Winchester and Jackson, 1982; 
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Armitage, 2006a; Armitage et al, 2010), being judged by burglars to be undesirable as 
a target for burglary (Brown and Bentley, 1993; Reppetto, 1974; Nee and Meenaghan, 
2006 and Armitage and Joyce, in press). These variables are all within the control of 
agencies tasked with the reduction of crime in England and Wales. Local authority 
Planning Departments receive planning applications for housing developments. 
Building/Development Control assess compliance with Building Regulations (for 
housing standards) and Police Architectural Liaison Officers/Crime Prevention 
Design Advisors/Designing out Crime Officers (ALO/CPDA/DOCOs) are consulted 
on the crime risk associated with proposed developments. All of these agencies are 
required by Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) to do all that they 
reasonably can to prevent crime; all are required by national planning policy and 
guidance to build safe communities and to consider crime prevention and security 
within planning, and all, to some extent, will be required by their Local Plan to design 
safe and sustainable communities. 
 
Research tells us that crime is “a risk to be calculated…or an accident to be avoided, 
rather than a moral aberration which needs to be explained” (Garland, 1996, p. 450-
451), and that many of those risks, particularly relating to burglary and vehicle crime, 
relate, to a large extent, to the design and layout of housing developments. These 
findings support a group a theories, known collectively as Opportunity Theories, that 
contend that opportunity plays a major role in influencing where and when crime will 
take place. These theories include Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), 
Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and Crime Pattern Theory 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). A full account of these theories is included in 
Part One of this book, but to recap, the basic assertions are that for a crime to occur, 
there has to be a suitable target - in the case of burglary, a vulnerable property. There 
has to be a likely offender - someone motivated to commit this offence, and the 
absence of a capable guardian – a resident, neighbour or passer-by who would 
challenge the offender, call the police and draw attention to the potential event 
(Routine Activity Theory). Opportunity Theories also argue that offenders select 
targets based upon what they become aware of as they go about their day-to-day 
activities and move between the places that they frequent (Crime Pattern Theory), and 
that offenders will seek to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks when making 
decisions about their offending choices (Rational Choice Theory).  
 
What is Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)? 
Approaches to crime reduction that adopt this theoretical perspective would therefore 
aim to block these opportunities, and in the case of Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED), this is achieved through the design and 
manipulation of the built environment. Housing estates are designed to limit the 
likelihood that potential offenders will pass by, and therefore become aware of, 
properties as suitable targets for offending. This is achieved through limiting 
unnecessary through movement in the form of connecting footpaths. The layout of 
housing within a residential area is also designed to maximise the likelihood that 
offenders will be observed (or that they perceive they are being observed), by 
residents, neighbours and/or passers-by. Opportunities for surveillance are thus 
maximised through the orientation of buildings, the size and positioning of windows 
and the absence of visual obstructions. Should these measures fail to deter potential 
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offenders, and they do become aware of a vulnerable property and are not deterred by 
the risk of surveillance, the standards of physical security (including doors, windows, 
locks) incorporated within the design of each property will make it very difficult for 
them to successfully break-in and enter.  
 
A commonly used formal definition of CPTED is that used by Tim Crowe who 
characterised it as: ‘The proper design and effective use of the built environment, that 
can lead to a reduction in the fear or incidence of crime and an improvement in 
quality of life...The goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for crime that may be 
inherent in the design of structures or in the design of neighbourhoods’ (Crowe, 2000, 
p. 46). Ekblom (2011) proposes a redefinition and presents the following alternative, 
which introduces several points not included within Crowe’s definition - including the 
balance between security and contextually appropriate design and the possibility of 
intervening at different stages between pre-planning and post construction. Ekblom 
states that CPTED is: ‘Reducing the possibility, probability and harm from criminal 
and related events, and enhancing the quality of life through community safety; 
through the processes of planning and design of the environment; on a range of 
scales and types of place, from individual buildings and interiors to wider landscapes, 
neighbourhoods and cities; to produce designs that are ‘fit for purpose’, contextually 
appropriate in all other respects and not ‘vulnerability led’; whilst achieving a 
balance between the efficiency of avoiding crime problems before construction and 
the adaptability of tackling them through subsequent management and maintenance’ 
(Ekblom , 2011, p. 4). More recently, research within the field of CPTED has focused 
upon the effectiveness of both the individual and collectively applied principles of 
CPTED measures in reducing crime and the fear of crime (by authors such as 
Armitage, 2000; 2006a; Cozens, 2008; Cozens et al, 2005; Hillier and Sahbaz, 2009; 
Pascoe, 1999), the process of applying CPTED principles within police and planning 
environments (by authors such as Monchuk, 2011), the development of CPTED based 
risk assessment tools to predict (and prevent) risk (by authors such as Armitage, 2006; 
Armitage et al, 2010; Van der Voordt and Van Wegen, 1990; Winchester and 
Jackson, 1982), and a wider approach to the potential benefits of such interventions 
including the impact upon environmental and social sustainability (by authors such as 
Armitage and Monchuk, 2011; Cozens, 2007; Dewberry, 2003).  Given a widening of 
the focus to include the process of application and consideration of benefits beyond 
crime reduction, such as social and environmental sustainability, a more appropriate 
definition of CPTED might be: The design, manipulation and management of the built 
environment to reduce crime and the fear of crime and to enhance sustainability 
through the process and application of measures at the micro (individual 
building/structure) and macro (neighbourhood) level. 
 
The principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)  
Explaining CPTED as a crime reduction method requires some discussion of the 
principles (or elements) that form this approach. Conscious that these principles are 
often presented as a given, with little discussion regarding their origins, definition, 
relevance to different countries, climates and cultures or their impact (individual or 
combined) upon the reduction of crime, the following section will attempt to tackle 
these oft omitted debates. 
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The principles of CPTED have been presented by several authors, including, but not 
exclusively, Poyner (1983), Cozens et al (2005) and Armitage (2013) and these have 
been adopted to form the basis of planning policy and guidance as well as CPTED 
based interventions such as Secured by Design (SBD) in England and Wales and 
Police Label Secure Housing in the Netherlands. Poyner (1983) outlined the 
principles as surveillance, movement control, activity support and motivational 
reinforcement. Cozens et al (2005) extended this to include the seven principles of 
defensible space, access control, territoriality, surveillance, target hardening, image 
and activity support. Armitage (2013) offered yet another combination of physical 
security, surveillance, movement control, management and maintenance and 
defensible space. This chapter will focus upon the principles of CPTED as defined by 
Armitage (2013).    
 
Defensible space and territoriality 
The term defensible space was coined by Oscar Newman (1973) who suggested that 
the physical design of a neighbourhood can either increase or inhibit people’s sense of 
control over the spaces in which they reside. Newman categorised space into public 
(for example, the road in front of a property), semi-public (for example, the front 
garden), semi-private (for example, the back garden) and private (inside the property). 
He argued that if space is defensible, it will be clear to the owner/user of that space, 
and to non-legitimate users, who should and who should not be in this space. CPTED 
interventions ensure that space is clearly demarcated, that it is obvious who has 
ownership of that space and that potential offenders have no excuse to be in that 
space. This would rarely be achieved through the installation of physical barriers; 
rather, interventions would include subtle measures such as a change in road colour 
and texture or a narrowing of the entrance to the development to mark the area as 
private. This is often referred to as a symbolic (as opposed to a physical) barrier. 
Offenders are not physically blocked from entering the area; the aim is to convince 
them that in entering an area they are crossing a boundary into private space and in 
doing so are more likely to be observed or challenged by those with ownership of that 
space. 
 
Brown and Altman (1983) and Armitage (2006) found that, compared with non-
burgled houses, properties that had experienced a burglary had fewer symbolic (as 
well as actual) barriers. In their study of 851 properties in Enschede (The 
Netherlands), Montoya et al (2014) found that houses with a front garden had a 
burglary risk 0.46 times lower than those without.  
 
Defensible space should, if working effectively, create territorial responses amongst 
the owners or managers of a space. This might take the form of challenging a 
stranger, calling the police, or simply making their presence known as a means of 
assuring the stranger that they are being observed. Brown and Bentley (1993) 
interviewed offenders, asking them to judge (from pictures) which properties would 
be more vulnerable to burglary. The results revealed that properties showing signs of 
territorial behavior (such as the installation of a gateway at the front of the property or 
a sign on the gate/door marking the area as private) were perceived by offenders to be 
less vulnerable to burglary. Montoya et al (2014) also found a significant relationship 
between signs of territorial responses and burglary risk, but only for daytime (as 
opposed to night time) burglary offences. Recent research (Armitage and Joyce, in 
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press) conducted with twenty convicted prolific adult burglars, currently serving a 
prison sentence for burglary offences, found that, whilst images depicting defensible 
space or territorial responses (such as a change in road colour or texture, a ‘private’ 
sign or a narrowing of the road entrance) did not elicit the greatest concern as a 
burglary deterrent, several expressed the view that they would avoid these areas. On 
being shown an image of a cul-de-sac with a narrowing at the entrance, a change in 
road colour and texture to mark the entrance and ‘Private Road’ written on the road, 
Offender Three stated: 
 
“People living here will have a bee in their bonnet! This is a private road for 
private people. I would feel awkward here. It’s all about the bluff and I 
couldn’t pull it off here” (Offender Three).  
 
Limiting through movement 
The principle of limiting through movement is based upon the theoretical 
underpinnings of both Crime Pattern and Rational Choice approaches (discussed 
earlier within this chapter). If offenders select targets based upon what they become 
aware of as they conduct their day-to-day activities, all things being equal, properties 
located on or close to popular travel paths will experience more crime. If offenders 
select targets that increase their likelihood of reward and reduce the risk of being 
caught, then they will select targets with easy access and escape routes. Thus, limiting 
the through movement into, through and out of a housing development will reduce the 
likelihood that an offender will become aware of a vulnerable property (suitable 
target). It will also reduce the likelihood that an offender will make a rational choice 
that the target will offer more reward than risk. In the case of CPTED and housing 
design, through movement refers to the presence of formal or informal footpaths – 
sometimes referred to as alleys, ginnels or alleyways. These are pedestrian paths, not 
accessible by motor vehicle. In most cases these footpaths link a housing estate to 
another residential area, to shops, to a park or school. However, in some cases these 
are simply access paths that run at the side or rear of houses (usually terraced 
housing) to allow residents to access the rear of the property without entering the 
house.  
 
Research studies have utilised a variety of methods to establish the extent to which 
crime risk varies according to levels of through movement within a housing 
development. These include analysis of police recorded crime as well as interviews 
with convicted burglars. The key research findings are summarised in Table 1, with 
the most recent studies discussed in detail below.    
 
Study Revealed that:  
 
Study Reference  
Being located on a development with high levels of 
permeability/connectivity/through-movement increases 
the risk of crime 
Bevis and Nutter (1977) 
Rubenstein et al (1980) 
Taylor and Gottfredson (1987) 
Van der Voordt and Van Wegen 
(1990) 
White (1990) 
Poyner and Webb (1991) 
Beavon et al (1994) 
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Mirlees-Black et al (1998) 
Rengert and Hakim (1998) 
Hakim et al (2001) 
Taylor (2002) 
Nubani and Wineman (2005) 
Yang (2006) 
Armitage (2006) 
Armitage et al (2010) 
Being located on a travel path increases the risk of 
crime 
Letkemann (1973) 
Brantingham and Brantingham 
(1984) 
Feeney  (1986) 
Gabor et al (1987) 
Poyner and Webb (1991) 
Wiles and Costello (2000) 
Rengert and Wasilchick (2000) 
Being located on a culs-de-sac, or a development with 
low connectivity, reduces the risk of crime 
Bevis and Nutter (1977) 
Johnson and Bowers (2010) 
Armitage et al (2010) 
Closing off streets reduces crime Matthews (1992) 
Atlas and LeBlanc (1994) 
Newman (1995,1996) 
Donnelly and Kimble (1997) 
Wagner (1997) 
Lasley (1998) 
Zavoski et al (1999) 
Eck (2002) 
Farrington and Welsh (2009) 
Being located on a leaky culs-de-sac increases the risk 
of crime 
Hillier (2004) 
Armitage (2006) 
Armitage et al (2010)  
Being located on a development with high levels of 
permeability/connectivity/through-movement reduces 
the risk of crime 
Hillier and Shu (1998) 
Shu (2000) 
Hillier (2004) 
Hillier and Sahbaz (2009) 
Table One: Key Research Findings - Through Movement and Crime Risk  
 
In their study of the impact of through movement on burglary risk in Merseyside, 
England, Johnson and Bowers (2010) test three hypotheses: 1) Risk of burglary will 
be greater on major roads and those intended to be used more frequently: 2) Risk of 
burglary will be higher on street segments that are connected to other segments, 
particularly where those to which they are connected have higher intended usage, and 
3) risk of burglary will be lower in culs-de-sac, particularly those that are non-linear 
and not integrated into the wider network of roads. Their sample included 118,161 
homes and used both GIS (Geographic Information System) software and manual 
identification to establish road networks and police recorded crime data to measure 
burglary levels. The results, which controlled for socio-economic influences, revealed 
that if a street segment is part of a major roadi, all other things being equal, compared 
to a local roadii there is an expected increase in the volume of residential burglaries on 
that segment of 22%. In contrast, for street segments classed as private roadsiii, 
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compared to a local road, there would be a 43% decrease in burglary. In terms of road 
network, the study suggested that for each additional link to other roads, the predicted 
burglary count would increase by a factor of 3%. If a street segment had five more 
connections than another, there would be an expected increase in burglaries at that 
segment of 16%. In terms of connectivity, the results revealed that being linked to one 
other major road increases the expected count of burglary by 8%. In contrast, being 
linked to a private road decreases the estimated burglary levels by 8%. The study 
concludes that culs-de-sac are safer than through roads and that sinuous (as opposed 
to linear) culs-de-sac are safer still – a sinuous cul-de-sac is curved so that, when 
standing at the entrance, you cannot see all the way to the end. Unfortunately, 
although culs-de-sac were manually identified within this study, there was no 
distinction between true (no connecting footpaths) and leaky (with connecting 
footpaths) culs-de-sac. Research conducted by Hillier (2004), Armitage (2006) and 
Armitage et al (2010) suggests that leaky culs-de-sac are the road layout most 
vulnerable to burglary.  
 
Armitage et al (2010) analysed the design features of over 6,000 properties on 44 
housing developments within the three police forces of Greater Manchester, Kent and 
West Midlands (England). Individual properties, their boundaries and the layout of 
the development on which they were located were meticulously and manually 
analysed and compared with prior victimisation (at property and development level). 
The results revealed that, compared to true culs-de-sac (those with no connecting 
paths), through roads experienced 93% more crime and leaky culs-de-sac (those with 
connecting paths) experiencing 110% more crime. The analysis also identified that 
crime risk was lower on sinuous compared to linear culs-de-sac - confirming the 
findings from Johnson and Bowers (2010).  
 
Several studies have also highlighted through-movement as a criminogenic feature in 
their production of crime risk-assessment mechanisms. Armitage’s (2006a) Burgess 
Checklist (derived from Simon’s Burgess Points System, 1971) allows the user to 
predict a property’s crime risk based upon its design features. The Burgess score is 
derived from the difference between the mean rate of crime suffered generally (by the 
whole sample) and the rate of crime suffered by houses with a particular design 
feature. Armitage identified through movement as a key factor associated with both 
burglary and crime-prone homes. Six of the 13 environmental factors which were 
associated with risk of burglary (at a statistically significant level), and eight of the 17 
factors which were associated with total crime (at a statistically significant level) were 
related to permeability and through-movement. In their Delft Checklist, Van der 
Voordt and Van (1990) also identified several factors relating to access and through 
movement which increased a property’s vulnerability to crime, these were: Number of 
entrances and escape routes, the ease of access to entrance and escape routes, the 
physical accessibility of entrance and escape routes and the absence of symbolic 
barriers.  
 
In addition to the analysis of police recorded crime data, Wiles and Costello (2000) 
used interviews with offenders and forensic data from the police DNA database as a 
means of investigating the decision making of offenders and the distance that they 
will travel to offend. The dominant reason given by offenders for selecting a target 
was chance (63% of offenders). Thirty-one per cent of the sample stated their reason 
for target selection as ‘passing and security looked poor’, 26% stated that they 
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selected a target because they were ‘passing and it looked unoccupied’ and 26% 
stated that they were ‘passing and the property looked isolated’. This confirms the 
premise that offenders will make target selections based on what they become aware 
of as they go about their daily activities and pass potential targets - each of these 
responses stating that the offender ‘was passing’ when making that judgement. 
Limiting through movement would reduce the likelihood of an offender ‘passing by’ a 
property.  
 
Additional research findings which support the premise that offenders select 
properties as they take part in day to day activities include Letkemann (1973) who 
found that burglars interviewed in British Columbia stated that they generally kept 
their eyes open for targets all of the time. Rengert and Wasilchick (2000) also found 
that convicted Philadelphia area burglars usually picked their targets within a limited 
distance of their normal travel paths, primarily along the axis of their usual home-to-
work travel path. Research conducted by Armitage and Joyce (in press) found that 
convicted prolific burglars favour developments with high levels of through 
movement for three major reasons. The first relates to the ease of access/egress this 
allows – primarily giving them an advantage over police who will be less aware of the 
area. The second rationale relates to the extent to which footpaths enable search 
behaviour, and finally, linked to the second, the belief that footpaths legitimise the 
search behaviour – a footpath is a public space and offenders are entitled to use that 
space. On being shown an image of a footpath running through a housing estate, 
Offender Two stated: 
 
“Yes, this is perfect! Easy pickings. I would first walk up and down this 
footpath. No-one would give me a second glance. Even if I was a tramp 
walking up and down I wouldn’t look out of place – it’s a footpath, no-one can 
question you” (Offender Two).   
 
Offenders confirmed the findings from Johnson and Bowers (2010) and Armitage et 
al (2010) that true culs-de-sac are a less attractive target. The reasons given were that 
you are likely to stand out as a stranger because “everyone knows each other” 
(Offender  Two) and because, on a true cul-de-sac you have to exit the estate the way 
that you went it – increasing the chances of detection. Offender Five summarised 
these suggestions: 
 
I wouldn’t go further into the cul-de-sac. There is no reason to be on a cul-de-
sac unless you live there. You aren’t going anywhere so you are a stranger. If 
it’s a through road you can just keep walking through. I feel like people know 
each other and they will see me as a stranger (Offender Five).  
 
In a review of the evidence relating to the impact of through movement on crime, 
Taylor (2002) concludes that: “Neighbourhood permeability is … one of the 
community level design features most reliably linked to crime rates, and the 
connections operate consistently in the same direction across studies: more 
permeability, more crime” (Taylor, 2002 p. 419). This assertion is over generalised. 
Whilst the vast majority of literature (see Table One) confirms that through-
movement within residential housing increases the risk of crime, there are a small 
number of studies (usually conducted using Space Syntax techniques) that argue that, 
based upon the premise that more people equates to more surveillance – what Jane 
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Jacobs (1961) refers to as eyes on the street, increased through movement reduces the 
risk of crime (Jones and Fanek, 1997; Hillier and Shu, 1998; Hillier and Shu, 2000 
and Shu and Huang, 2003; Hillier, 2004). The premise being that an increased 
presence of individuals will deter potential offenders or increase the chances of 
detection should they commit a crime. As can be seen in Table One, whilst there is 
some disparity amongst research studies regarding the impact of through movement 
on crime, there is little doubt from the research that increased through movement 
enhances crime risk.   
 
Surveillance 
Surveillance refers to the way that an area is designed to maximise the ability of 
formal (security guards, police, employees) or informal (residents, passers-by, 
shoppers) users of the space to observe suspicious behaviour. Within CPTED, 
surveillance rarely relates to formal measures but refers more to the informal 
surveillance created through, say, ensuring that dwelling entrances face the street, that 
rooms facing the street are active (such as the kitchen or living room) and that 
sightlines are not obstructed by shrubbery or high walls.  Linked with territoriality, 
the principle of surveillance requires users of that space to recognise that an 
individual is behaving in a suspicious manner (be that through their behaviour or 
simply their presence within a private/semi-private area) and to have the confidence 
to challenge them or intervene. Therefore, the term surveillance includes the 
operational tasks of active (formal) and passive (informal) surveillance, the 
surveillability (Ekblom, 2011) of that space and the creation of the perception 
amongst offenders that they are being observed.  
 
Research suggests that surveillance and visibility play a major part in offenders’ 
decision-making processes when selecting properties to offend against. Offenders 
prefer to avoid confrontation and, where possible, select targets which are 
unoccupied. Reppetto (1974) interviewed 97 convicted burglars and found that the 
most common reason for avoiding a target was that there were too many people 
around. Offenders stated that the possibility of neighbours watching them deterred 
them from selecting a property and that they would select targets where they felt less 
conspicuous and where there was less visual access to neighbouring properties. In 
interviews with a sample of 30 active burglars, Cromwell and Olson (1991) found that 
over ninety per cent of the sample stated that they would never enter a residence 
which they suspected to be occupied.  
 
Brown and Bentley (1993) asked 72 incarcerated burglars to assess, from 
photographs, whether or not properties had been burgled. Across all ten homes, the 
houses judged to be occupied were perceived by the burglars as being those which 
had not been burgled.  
 
Nee and Meenaghan (2006) interviewed fifty residential burglars in the UK. The 
findings confirm those presented above, that offenders prefer to select unoccupied 
properties, and properties with little or no surveillance from neighbouring houses. The 
most commonly referred to feature of attractive targets was the degree of cover (47 
respondents). Three-quarters (38) of the sample preferred a property to be 
unoccupied, with two-thirds of that number checking this by knocking on the door or 
ringing the bell.  
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When assessing the design characteristics of victimised properties, several studies 
identified a lack of surveillance or poor levels of visibility as key features of crime-
prone homes (for example, Armitage, 2006; Armitage et al, 2010; Winchester and 
Jackson, 1982; Van der Voordt and Van Wegen, 19990). Armitage (2006) found that 
there was a complex relationship between surveillance and crime risk. Surveillance 
from neighbouring properties appeared to reduce crime risk, yet surveillance from a 
nearby road or footpath enhanced a property’s risk of crime (linked to Crime Pattern 
Theory and the importance of awareness space). Armitage’s research found that being 
overlooked at the front by neighbouring properties produced a Burgess risk score of -
0.6 (suggesting a less than average crime risk). Not being overlooked at the front 
produced a Burgess risk score of +5.7 (an above average crime risk). This is clearly 
related to the benefit of informal surveillance from neighbours who are able, and 
likely, to act as Capable Guardians. Where a property was visible from a nearby 
footpath, crime risk increased (Burgess score of +6.3), as did risk for properties 
located within viewing distance of traffic lights (Burgess risk score of +46.6 - the 
second highest score).  
 
Research conducted across three police forces in the UK revealed findings to support 
those presented above. Armitage et al (2010) found that properties overlooked by 
between three and five other properties experienced 38% less crime than those not 
overlooked.  
 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) found that, of the 14 design variables linked to 
heightened risk of burglary, eight relate to a lack of surveillance from neighbouring 
properties. These variables include: property is isolated, property is set in a location 
with less than five other houses in sight, property is set at a distance from the road on 
which it stands, property is not overlooked at the front by other houses, property is not 
overlooked on either side by other houses, the majority of the sides of the house are 
not visible from a public area, the property is set at a distance from the nearest house 
and the property frontage is obscured from roadside view.  
 
Brown and Altman (1983) studied 306 burgled and non-burgled properties and found 
that burgled houses showed fewer indications of the probable presence of residents 
that non-burgled properties. These signs or traces included toys strewn across the yard 
or sprinklers operating in the garden. Brown and Altman also found that burgled 
properties had less visual access to neighbouring properties.  
 
As was referred to above, Van der Voordt and Van Wegen (1990) also developed a 
checklist for measuring the risk of crime – the Delft Checklist. Of the factors which 
they identified as predictors of crime risk, several related to surveillance and 
visibility. These were: visual contact between buildings, amenities and outside spaces, 
sightlines between buildings and adequate levels of lighting. 
 
Authors such as Jane Jacobs (1961) highlight the importance of informal surveillance 
from those living and working within an area and from those users of the space who 
are simply passing by. Jacobs refers to this as ‘eyes on the street’, commenting:  
  
 ‘...there must be eyes on the street, eyes belonging to those we might  
call the natural proprietors of the street...the sidewalk must have users  
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on it fairly continuously, both to add to the number of effective eyes on  
the street and to induce a sufficient number of people in buildings along  
the street to watch the sidewalks’ (Jacobs, 1961, p.35).  
 
Of course this argument has many weaknesses, the most notable being that, whilst a 
street may be surveyed by many people, those people do not always notice crimes 
taking place (Gelfand et al, 1973; Mayhew, 1979) and if they do, they do not always 
intervene (Rosenthal, 1964; Latane and Darley, 1970). This concept of self policing, 
which may apply in busy cities (which were the focus of Jacobs’ work) is also 
weakened when transferred to suburban residential developments which are less 
densely populated. As Cozens (2011) highlights, many social as well as design factors 
make this concept less likely to apply within residential settings. In many cultures, it 
is common for both adults within a household to work full-time and developments 
have few or no community facilities, making surveillance from those living, working 
and passing through the area, less likely to take place.  
 
Recognising the difference between predicted/potential surveillance and that which 
actually takes place, Reynald (2009) conducted a study which measured the 
relationship between guardianship intensity and surveillance opportunities on a 
sample of 814 residential properties in The Hague. Reynald measured guardianship 
intensity using a four-stage model which moves from stage one – invisible guardian 
stage (no evidence that the property is occupied), to stage two – available guardian 
stage (evidence that the property is occupied), to stage three – the capable guardian 
stage (fieldworkers are observed by residents), to stage four – intervening guardian 
stage (fieldworkers are challenged by residents). Surveillance opportunities were 
measured by observing the extent to which the view of a property’s windows was 
obstructed by physical features such as trees and walls. The results revealed a positive 
statistically significant correlation between surveillance opportunities and 
guardianship intensity (0.45), suggesting that guardianship intensity increases as 
opportunities for surveillance increase. When assessing the relationship between 
crime and guardianship intensity, the results were positive and statistically significant. 
The analysis revealed that crime decreases consistently at each stage of the four-stage 
model. Crime drops significantly between the invisible and available guardian stages, 
decreasing even more at the capable guardian stage and slightly more at the 
intervening stage.  
 
Study Revealed  
 
Study Reference  
 
Offenders avoid properties with visual access to 
neighbouring houses. 
Repetto (1974) 
Offenders select targets with less visual access to 
neighbouring properties.  
Repetto (1974) 
Nee and Meenaghan (2006) 
Offenders select targets which are unoccupied.  Cromwell et al (1991) 
Nee and Meenaghan (2006) 
Offenders avoid targets which are occupied (or perceived 
to be occupied).  
Brown and Bentley (1973)  
Increasing levels of surveillance enhances guardianship 
activity.  
Reynald (2009) 
Properties overlooked by neighbouring properties 
experience less crime.  
Armitage (2006) 
Armitage et al (2010) 
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Winchester and Jackson (1982) 
Van der Voordt and Van Wegen 
(1990) 
Properties not overlooked by neighbouring properties 
experience more crime.  
Armitage (2006) 
Armitage et al (2010) 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) 
Van der Voordt and Van Wegen 
(1990) 
Properties with less visual signs of presence of residents 
experience more crime.  
Brown and Altman (1983) 
Properties with front door facing away from the street 
experience more physical and social decay.  
Coleman (1986) 
Properties with view from roadside obscured/obstructed 
experience more crime.  
Winchester and Jackson (1982) 
Properties visible from nearby footpaths experience more 
crime. 
Armitage (2006) 
Armitage et al (2010) 
Property located within close proximity of stop sign, 
traffic lights, commercial business establishment, park, 
church or busy road are more attractive to offenders. 
Cromwell et al (1991) 
Properties located within viewing distance of traffic 
lights experience more crime.  
Armitage (2006) 
Properties located on a main road experience more crime.  Winchester and Jackson (1982) 
Groff and La Vigne (2001) 
Increased levels of street activity reduces crime.  Jacobs (1961) 
Properties in areas less illuminated by street lighting 
experience more crime. 
Groff and La Vigne (2001) 
Van der Voordt and Van Wegen 
(1990) 
Welsh and Farrington (2009) 
Table Two: Key research findings - Surveillance and Visibility  
Physical security 
Physical security (or target hardening) refers to the standards of windows, doors, 
locks, fences, or other physical structures of a property and its boundary, that increase 
the difficulty for offenders in entering a building or space. Research on security 
measures as a means of preventing burglary suggests that, all other factors being 
equal, burglars prefer to offend against properties with lower levels of physical 
security (Cromwell and Olson, 1991). Budd’s (1999) analysis of the British Crime 
Survey found that security devices are extremely effective in reducing the risk of 
burglary victimization. Budd found that, in England and Wales in 1997, 15% of 
households without security measures were burgled, compared to just 4% of 
households with basic measures in place and 3% with higher levels of security. 
 
Vollaard and Ours (2011) report the findings of an extensive assessment of built-in 
security in the Netherlands. This study utilises the introduction of changes in building 
regulations introduced in 1999 which required all windows and doors (for new build 
properties) to be made from material certified and approved by the European ENV 
1627:1994 Class 2 standard, or the Dutch NEN 5096, Class 2 standard. Using data 
from four waves of the annual National Victimization Survey (VMR), the results 
reveal that the regulatory change resulted in a reduction in burglary (within the 
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sample) from 1.1 to 0.8 per cent annually – a reduction of 26 per cent. The results also 
reveal that the enhancement in security within new homes resulted in increased 
protection for older, less-protected homes within close proximity of the new homes – 
thus suggesting a diffusion of crime control benefits (see Clarke and Weisburd, 1994). 
The analysis also suggests that burglary offences are not being displaced to other 
property crimes such as bicycle or vehicle theft. These regulations relate specifically 
to the physical security of property, and not the wider CPTED measures required by 
the Police Label Secure Housing scheme (discussed in more detail below). To ensure 
that the effect being measured was independent of the scheme, these properties were 
excluded from the sample. Research conducted by Montoya, Junger and Ongena 
(2014) in the Netherlands confirm these findings.   
 
In interviews with convicted prolific burglars in the UK, Armitage and Joyce (in 
press) found that, with the exception of one brand of monitored burglar alarms, 
offenders were not deterred by the presence of an alarm, suggesting that: a) only one 
brand of alarm continues to sound when the internal box is ripped off the wall, b) the 
majority of neighbours would simply view that noise as an annoyance and not 
respond, c) they would cover the external box in sealant foam the night before to 
dumb the alarm, or d) they would simply allow the alarm to go off and come back 
when it had finished. 
 
Tseloni et al (2014) conducted an in-depth analysis of the relationship between 
physical security measures and burglary risk in England and Wales. Using data from 
four sweeps of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) - formerly the 
British Crime Survey, they presented the crime reduction benefits of individual and 
combined security features reported to be present by those taking part in the survey. 
The research found that certain combinations of security features confer a crime 
reduction advantage, but that the protection conferred against burglary does not 
consistently increase with the number of devices installed. The analysis suggested that 
if only one security device was to be installed, the most effective device would be 
external lights on a sensor. If one further device was to be added, the most effective 
pair of security devices would be window locks and external lights. The ultimate 
choice for balancing out the number of devices and protection against burglary was 
window and door locks together with either external lights or a security chain. The 
study concluded that individual security devices confer up to three times greater 
protection against burglary than no security and that combinations of security devices 
in general afford up to fifty times more protection than no security.  
 
The same study looked at the protection afforded by burglar alarms on properties 
covered by multiple sweeps of the CSEW. The results (published in Tilley et al, 
2015) revealed that for the majority of CSEW sweeps, burglar alarms were associated 
with either no change or, more often, a substantial increase in the risk of burglary 
with entry. The results also suggested that the presence of a burglar alarm seems to be 
diminishing as a protective factor with earlier sweeps showing a positive impact on 
burglary with entry. This is despite the technical advances in the quality of burglar 
alarms systems. Tilley et al (2015) propose seven possible hypotheses to explain this 
counterintuitive finding. These include: i) dodgy data, ii) respondent error - that the 
respondent has reported that the alarm was installed at the time of the burglary when 
in actual fact it was installed as a consequence of the burglary (and therefore post-
victimisation), iii) latent repeat victims – that the alarm was installed as a response to 
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a previous burglary and it is that burglary that boosts the likelihood of repeat 
victimization, iv) adaptive offenders, v) flags for target attractiveness – that the 
presence of an alarm suggests rich pickings, vi) dilution/discredit/drowned out – that 
the mass availability of alarms has meant that their deterrent effect is diluted, vii) 
heterogeneity in systems and effects – that the CSEW only measures the presence of 
an alarm, not the standard or quality of each device.  
 
Image/management and maintenance 
Cozens et al (2005) use the term image, while others have used management and 
maintenance to cover the principle of creating buildings/spaces which are physically 
free from litter, graffiti, vandalism and damage but are also areas without stigma or a 
poor social reputation.  
 
Several studies have suggested that if low-level disorder such as vandalism and litter 
are not addressed, they can act as a catalyst for more serious crimes. Skogan (1990) 
refers to this as the contagion theory, suggesting that the “presence of vandalism 
stimulates more vandalism” (p.39). Wilson and Kelling (1982) refer to this 
contagious effect as the “broken windows theory” (p.16). This suggests that an area 
with existing deterioration such as graffiti and vandalism conveys the impression that 
a) nobody cares so apprehension is less likely and b) the area is already untidy so one 
more act will go unnoticed. This is supported by Taylor and Gottfredson (1987), and 
later tested by Keizer et al (2008), who found that physical incivilities indirectly 
influence offenders’ perception of risk in that they portray a resident’s level of care or 
concern for the area in which they live, thus acting as an indicator for the likelihood 
that they will intervene if they detect an offence taking place.  
 
In her study of the link between environmental design features and crime within West 
Yorkshire, Armitage (2006) found evidence of brief and long-term desertion to be 
statistically significantly associated with prior burglary in a sample of 1058 
properties. Forty two per cent of the properties which showed signs of brief desertion 
had been burgled at least once; this was compared to just 15.8% of properties which 
did not show signs of brief desertion. Additionally, 45.5% of the properties which 
showed signs of lengthy desertion had been burgled at least once. This was compared 
to a figure of just 15.8% for houses without signs of lengthy desertion.  
 
In a series of papers, Cozens et al (2001, 2002a and 2002b) revealed photographs of 
two contrasting versions, one being well maintained, the other poorly maintained, of 
five housing designs – detached, semi-detached, terraced, low-rise flats and high rise 
flats. Participants were asked to judge each property’s vulnerability to burglary. The 
results revealed that elderly residents, convicted burglars, planning professionals, 
police and young adults consistently selected the ‘well maintained’ option as the 
safest for all five design types.  
 
In recent research, Armitage and Joyce (in press) have refuted the importance of this 
principle, with none of the offenders interviewed suggesting that an un-maintained 
property would attract them (based on the premise that the residents are unlikely to 
challenge them). When shown images of untidy properties, almost all offenders stated 
that they would not be attracted to the property because “there would be nothing to 
take” (Offender 2). More worrying, a number of offenders stated the opposite, that a 
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tidy property would attract them as it suggests that there would be financial rewards: 
“You want a nice tidy garden, if you mow your lawn, you care for your house and will 
have nice things” (Offender 13). 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) in practice 
There are examples, England and Wales and the Netherlands being the most notable, 
of interventions that bring these CPTED principles together as award schemes. In 
England and Wales, the Secured by Design (SBD) scheme is managed by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers Crime Prevention Initiatives (ACPO CPI)iv and 
is run on a day-to-day basis by local police ALOs, CPDAs or DOCOs whose role is to 
ensure that developments are designed and built to certain specifications. Within 
England and Wales, these roles have traditionally been performed by warranted 
police, although cuts in police budgets have led, not only to a dramatic reduction in 
numbers (from 347 in January 2009 to 125 in November 2014), but also towards 
moves to civilianise this role. SBD is based upon the key principles of CPTED and 
sets standards for properties and the wider development based upon physical security, 
surveillance, through movement, territoriality and management and maintenance. 
There have been five published evaluations of the effectiveness of the SBD scheme 
(Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 2000, Teedon et al, 2009 and 2010; Armitage 
and Monchuk, 2011) each concluding that SBD confers a crime reduction advantage.  
 
Several studies have also concluded that the SBD scheme is a cost-effective measure 
(Armitage, 2000; Association of British Insurers, 2006; Teedon et al, 2009). The 
Association of British Insurers (2006) estimate that the over-costs of building to the 
SBD standard are £200 for a four-bedroom detached house, £170 for a three or two-
bedroom detached house, £240 for a ground floor apartment and £70 for an upper 
floor apartment. Pease and Gill (2011) re-analysed the findings from Armitage and 
Monchuk’s (2011) study of the effectiveness of SBD, and established that, taking the 
Davis Langdon (2010) figures for the cost of SBD and setting these against the crimes 
saved, SBD pays for itself in just under two years considering only burglary and 
criminal damage offences. The inclusion of other offences, they state, would reduce 
this period.   
 
The Netherlands has a similar award scheme – Police Label Secure Housing. Unlike 
the SBD scheme, this award (which was originally owned and managed by the police) 
is managed by the Dutch government who adopted the police label into their planning 
policy guidelines and since 2004 it has been required that every new estate or 
dwelling be built in accordance with the police label or an equivalent label. Although 
the award was modelled on SBD, there are several distinctions which mark the two 
schemes apart. The first is that the label is split into three different certificates – 
Secured Dwelling, Secured Building and Secured Neighbourhood. These can be 
issued separately but together they form the Police Label Secure Housing award. The 
label is also less prescriptive than SBD with more flexibility for developers aiming to 
achieve a secure development. The requirements are set out under five categories 
(urban planning and design, public areas, layout, building, dwelling) and these include 
performance requirements (what) and specifications which indicate the way in which 
those requirements will be met (how). As a means of encouraging creativity and 
avoiding the risk of developers ‘designing down’ to specific requirements, where a 
developer offers a solution which differs from that set out in the ‘how’, but can still 
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demonstrate the same preventative effect, then this will be considered. The scheme 
also differs in that it is valid for ten years only and after this period, a re-assessment is 
required. In terms of the delivery of the scheme, the system is very similar to that 
within England and Wales. Until 2009, each police region had a number of Building 
Plan Advisors (Bouwplanadviseur) whose role was very similar to the 
ALO/CPDA/DOCO role. As a response to budget cuts, the role has been civilianised 
and is run by the municipalities either through the employment of external consultants 
or civilian Building Plan Advisors located in-house.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly outlined the theories upon which CPTED is based; it has 
presented a discussion of the five principles that form this approach alongside 
evidence of their effectiveness, alone or combined, in reducing crime. The chapter has 
also briefly introduced the approaches to implementing CPTED in England and Wales 
and the Netherlands – two countries in which crime reduction has been given 
particular consideration within the planning system. CPTED has received criticism as 
a crime reduction approach – some argue that it focuses too heavily upon the event as 
opposed to the offender, ignoring the root causes of crime; it places too much 
responsibility on victims to take preventative action, and it is too simplistic. One of 
the central difficulties in convincing senior practitioners and policy makers of the 
benefits of this approach is the length of time it takes for any crime reduction benefits 
to become apparent. Think of the time it takes for a planning application to be 
submitted, considered (and possibly rejected, re-submitted and reconsidered), for the 
development to be built, sold, occupied and then for a crime problem to emerge. This 
is not a quick win! In many cases the crime reduction benefits of applying CPTED 
principles may never become apparent. Take for example a field with no houses, and 
therefore no burglary or acquisitive crime problems. If a housing estate is built on that 
field and it meets the SBD criteria, crime is likely to be low, but within the life of that 
development, there will be some crime and disorder incidents. Where are the crime 
reduction benefits of building to SBD? Where is the praise for senior police or 
planners making local policy decisions? Whilst there are limitations and areas for 
improvement, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that CPTED is a cost-
effective crime reduction measure. That the individual principles upon which it is 
based show crime reduction benefits, as do the combined implementation of these 
principles. It is an approach that requires multi-agency working. Partners as diverse as 
police, planners, architects, developers and social housing providers must work 
together – meeting requirements such as those set out in Section 17 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998) in England and Wales. If implemented at the planning or pre-
planning stage, consideration for the principles of CPTED add very low extra costs to 
a housing development, and the benefits outweigh these costs and last for decades. To 
the criticism of simplicity, CPTED may not be rocket science, but as Ekblom (2011) 
highlights, rocket science itself is actually ‘dead simple – feed fuel and oxidant into a 
chamber, stand well back, ignite, apply Newton’s laws of motion, and whoosh’ (p. 
279). Whilst this approach may not produce those much sought after ‘quick wins’, the 
benefits (once they materialise) are likely to last for decades, or to make the 
counterpoint, the failure to address vulnerabilities of design could leave a legacy of 
increased crime risk for just as long a period. With CPTED we have a simple 
technique that allows the opportunities for crime to be designed out of residential 
housing before the problems emerge. It creates an environment in which key agencies 
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must work together to demonstrate and deliver their requirement to consider crime 
prevention, and it creates environments where people want to live and work, both now 
and in the future – the very definition of sustainable housing.  
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i
 Major roads connect cities, towns and the larger areas between them. 
ii
 Local roads form the urban backcloth on which residential estates are built, and they facilitate easy travel between one local 
road to another. They are unlikely to be used for vehicular travel for anything other than local trips, but do connect 
neighbourhoods and allow travel within and between them. 
iii
 Private roads are intended for use by residents alone and not for connecting places. Some of these will be culs-de-sac, some 
will be through roads. 
iv
 The Association of Chief Police Officers has been replaced by the National Police Chiefs Council and, at the time of writing, 
the ownership of SBD had not been confirmed.  
